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Abstract
The increase in debt-free or under-levered firms (financial conservatism) is
one of the most recent stylized puzzles that cannot be explained within the
context of extant capital structure theories. In this paper, we exploit the
2008–09 contractions in credit supply in a quasi-natural experiment to examine
whether financial conservatism affects firm value. Using a large sample of
firms from seven African countries over the period 2003–2012, we find strong
evidence that financial conservatism mitigates the adverse effect of contrac-
tions in credit supply on firm value for both local and international firms. Our
results suggest that financial conservatism is an effective strategy for managing
risks arising from contractions in credit supply and international business
exposure. These findings provide novel empirical evidence on the value rele-
vance of financial conservatism which shields firms from the adverse and far-
reaching effects of contractions in credit supply.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
One of the most recent stylized puzzles in corporate
finance is the increase in debt-free or under-levered
(financial conservatism, thereon) firms which is contrary
to predictions of the main capital structure theories. The
trend implies that firms are increasingly forgoing the
benefits associated with debt finance such as interest tax
shield, lower costs of capital and the disciplinary role of
debt (Bessler, Drobetz, Haller, & Meier, 2013; Bigelli,
Martín-Ugedo, & Sánchez-Vidal, 2014; Graham &
Harvey, 2001). This puzzling phenomenon has motivated
several studies on the determinants of financial conserva-
tism. For example, Bigelli et al. (2014) show that financial
conservatism is more pronounced in smaller firms and
firms with low intangible assets and effective tax rates.
Bessler et al. (2013) also report that financial conserva-
tism is higher in common law countries, countries with
higher creditor protection and in jurisdictions with divi-
dend relief tax systems. Notwithstanding the contribu-
tions of these papers, it remains unclear whether
financial conservatism has any financial benefit or cost,
especially during periods of heightened uncertainty and
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contractions in credit supply such as the global financial cri-
sis. In this paper, we address the above research gap and
provide new insights on whether financial conservatism
enhances or preserves firm value during the 2008–09 credit
supply shock within the context of emerging markets.
The effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) are still
being felt, and much is yet to be understood about how and
why it affected some economic agents more than others at
firm, industry and country level (Anginer & Demirguc-
Kunt, 2014; Dawood, Horsewood, & Strobel, 2017).1 Our
study sheds light on the above research question and is
important for two main reasons. First, as the link between
financing and real decisions is contentious, the 2008–09
exogenous credit supply shock provides a rare and unique
quasi-natural experiment setting that enables us to examine
this issue directly.2 Second, the 2008–09 contraction in
credit supply offers an opportunity to examine how eco-
nomic shocks originating in developed countries propagate
and affect firms in less integrated and understudied emerg-
ing economies. This is of particular importance as there is a
general consensus that the effects of the GFC vary in both
intensity and duration with the level of economic integra-
tion (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011; Berman & Martin, 2012;
Duygun, Isaksson, & Kaulich, 2016). By focusing on the
GFC, we provide direct empirical evidence on the adverse
effects of the crisis across emerging economies and whether
these are moderated by financing structures.
Using a large sample of publicly listed African firms, we
examine the effects of financial conservatism on firm value
over the period 2003–2012. We contend that as the GFC was
an unexpected credit supply shock, firms had limited or no
time to adjust their financing policies, hence, our estimates are
less likely to be biased by reverse causality. As expected, we
find that the GFC had a significant negative effect on firm
value. On average, firm value decreased by 14%–20% after
2008. This decrease is robust to different definitions of firm
value, the window-period used and other factors that are
known to affect firm value. However, in our main analysis we
find that this negative effect is insignificant and less pro-
nounced for firms that are financially conservative. This find-
ing is novel as the prior literature on financial conservatism is
rather confined to the examination of the determinants of con-
servatism and does not investigate when and where it is most
beneficial.3 Thus, our results suggest that financial conserva-
tism has several important implications on firm value in the
aftermath of the GFC as it increases resilience to contractions
in credit supply.
We further find that the severity of the 2008–09 contrac-
tions in credit supply varies across firms and countries as well
as over time. Our results show that the panic occurred earlier
in Africa relative to developed countries, with the decrease in
firm value peaking in 2006, and diminishing thereafter. This is
inconsistent with the US studies of Almeida and
Campello (2007) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) that
report severe adverse effects during the 2008–09 period. We
further find that firms with international exposure, through
either cross-listing or foreign sales, were more affected than
purely domestic firms and that this effect is moderated by
financial conservatism. This implies that firms with high expo-
sure to international markets can mitigate the associated risks
by adopting conservative financing policies. Our results further
show that firms in common law countries (Nigeria,
South Africa, Egypt and Kenya), which are more integrated
with the US and the UK (where the crisis originated), were
more affected by the crisis than those in civil law countries
(Morocco, Tunisia and Ivory Coast). Hence, high levels of eco-
nomic integration and similar legal systems expose firms in
vulnerable countries to severe credit supply shocks originating
from developed economies.
We contribute to the literature in five ways. First, we
show that financial conservatism is beneficial during the
2008–09 contractions in credit supply. This implies that
firms with conservative financial policies, specifically those
that are debt-free or unlevered, are better positioned to
manage the adverse effect of credit supply shocks relative to
those with less conservative financial policies. Second, we
contend that, as market imperfections are more apparent in
emerging economies, this should result in a pronounced
effect of financing decisions on firm value. In line with this
prediction, we find that the adverse effects of the GFC
increase with leverage since financially conservative firms
in our context were less affected relative to non-
conservative ones. Third, our results show that economic
ties and international business exposure increase vulnera-
bility to economic shocks, but this effect diminishes with
financial conservatism. Fourth, we find that firms in com-
mon law countries that have closer links to the US and the
UK were more adversely affected by the GFC, but this is
less visible for financially conservative firms. Finally, we
show that firms in African countries that are less integrated
and understudied were also adversely affected by the GFC.4
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the literature review and hypotheses. In Sec-
tion 3, we present the methodology used. Section 4 explains
the data and variable construction. Section 5 presents and
discusses the empirical results. Section 6 presents the
robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 | LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESES
Our study builds upon four strands of the literature,
namely, (1) the effects of contractions in credit supply on
corporate decisions, (2) the nexus between financing and
real activities, (3) the link between internationalization
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and corporate outcomes and (4) the effect of legal origin
on corporate outcomes.
2.1 | The GFC, financial conservatism
and firm value
Over the past few decades, the frequency and severity of
economic crises have increased. The majority of these crises
have either been country-specific (e.g., Turkish, Argentinian
and Russian crisis of 2001, 1992–2002 and 2014, respec-
tively) or region-specific (e.g., the Asian financial crisis of
the late 1990s and the 2010 euro-zone crisis). The exception
is the 2008–09 GFC. As the GFC originated from the US
subprime mortgage market and propagated to other coun-
tries (unlike other previous regional or country-specific cri-
ses) it is not surprising that it has motivated considerable
research. However, studies on the effects of the GFC have
reported mixed results, with Campello, Graham, and Har-
vey (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), Almeida,
Murillo, Bruno, and Scott (2012), Udenio, Hoberg, and
Fransoo (2018) and Rehman, Chaudhry, and Hussain (2019)
documenting significant adverse effects on corporate deci-
sions, while Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008), Lemmon
and Roberts (2010), Kahle and Stulz (2013), Caporale, Lodh,
and Nandy (2018), Zouaghi, Sánchez, and Martínez (2018)
and Choudhry, Hassan, and Shabi (2020) report no or low
effects.5 The findings of the latter studies are contrary to the
central prediction that firms with weaker balance sheets are
more likely to be credit rationed during periods of height-
ened uncertainty (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997). In addition
to this lack of consensus in the literature, there is a dearth
of studies that have examined whether firm financial poli-
cies provide a shield or increase exposure to the 2008–09
contractions in credit supply.
We address the above research gap and contribute to
the literature by examining whether conservative finan-
cial policies were important in protecting or shielding
firms from the adverse effects of the GFC. Our focus is
motivated by the growing interest among academics in
understanding why firms are increasingly adopting con-
servative financial policies (zero and low leveraging) (see
Bessler et al., 2013; Bigelli et al., 2014; Dang, 2013; Devos
et al., 2012). By adopting such policies, firms are implic-
itly choosing to forgo the benefits of debt finance, which
is inconsistent with the mainstream theories. While
extant studies have investigated the determinants of
financial conservatism, the question of whether financial
conservatism is value relevant during contractions in
credit supply is yet to be examined. We contend that
unlevered or conservative firms are less likely to be
affected by contractions in credit supply since they are
more reliant on internal and equity financing.
Accordingly, they ought to be better positioned to man-
age the adverse effects of contractions in credit supply
relative to levered firms as they have prior experience in
managing investments without debt financing. This is in
line with economic theories of predation in which firms
may voluntarily decide to lower their leverage to gain a
competitive edge and market share during economic
slumps (see Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996). Against this
background, we, therefore, formulate and test the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis: 1 Financial conservatism enhances firm
value during contractions in credit supply.
2.2 | International exposure, legal origin,
financial conservatism and firm value
Globalization has spurred the movement of firms across
national boundaries to increase market share, profitability
and competitive advantage. This has motivated recent
research focusing on the interface between international busi-
ness and finance (see Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, & Williamson,
2009; Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018; Areneke &
Kimani, 2019). Several extant studies document that interna-
tionalization has several important benefits to the firm, such
as improvements in corporate practices, profitability and firm
value. For example, Juasrikul, Sahaym, Yim, and Liu (2018)
show that international alliances with developed market
MNEs (DMMNEs) enhance the firm value of emerging mar-
ket multinationals (EMMNEs). Similarly, Hsu, Chen, and
Cheng (2013) find that international expansion enhances
growth opportunities and access to cutting-edge technology.
However, not much has been done on investigating whether
firm internationalization increases contagion risks and expo-
sure to international shocks, and whether financial policies
moderate this effect.
We address this lack of research by focusing on the dif-
ferential effects of the GFC on cross-listed firms and firms
with foreign sales. Firms can achieve internationalization
through cross listing in other countries. Drawing on the
bonding hypothesis of Coffee (2002), cross listing enhances
access to external finance and scrutiny as firms bond with
international practices. This improves the competitive edge
and the relative performance of cross-listed firms over
domestic firms. As a result, cross listing enhances firm
value (Charitou & Louca, 2009; Coffee, 2002) and the qual-
ity of corporate governance, thus improves access to exter-
nal finance and mitigates agency costs and information
asymmetry problems (see Areneke & Kimani, 2019; Lel &
Miller, 2008). However, during contractions in credit sup-
ply, cross listing is likely to increase susceptibility to inter-
national shocks. We contend that financing policies can
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moderate this adverse effect since cross-listed firms with
conservative financial policies are less likely to be affected
by credit supply shocks. This arises because, unlike levered
firms, conservative firms are not dependent on debt financ-
ing for their survival. Thus, conservative financial policies
reduce or moderate the adverse impact of the contractions
in credit supply for cross-listed firms during the GFC. We,
therefore, hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis: 2 Financial conservatism mitigates the
adverse effects of the GFC on the value of firms with
international business exposure through cross listing.
As not all internationalised firms are cross-listed, we
use foreign sales as another proxy for international busi-
ness exposure. We posit that during contractions in credit
supply, firms with foreign sales are more likely to be
affected by contagion effects as their sales shrink both
domestically and internationally. However, if our first
hypothesis (H1) holds, this severe adverse effect is likely to
be moderated by financial conservatism. Financial conser-
vatism, in this case, increases strategic flexibility, which
frees the firm to pursue other growth prospects or new
markets rather than focus entirely on dealing with debt-
overhang issues (which affect levered firms) triggered by
the contraction in credit supply. Against this background,
we formulate and test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: 3 Financial conservatism mitigates the
adverse effects of the GFC on the value of firms with
foreign sales.
Finally, the legal origin of countries ensures strong ties
in policies and governance systems such as property rights
and investors protection (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1997). As noted earlier, Bessler et al. (2013) show
that countries with high creditor protection and common
law systems have the highest number of financially conser-
vative firms. Drawing on this finding, we conjecture that
legal origin ensures complementariness and strong ties with
countries that have similar systems. While these ties are
beneficial, they also constitute another channel that can aid
in the transmission of economic shocks to other countries.
As the 2008–09 credit supply shock originated in the US
and the UK, we expect firms in common law countries to
have been more affected relative to those in civil law sys-
tems. Accordingly, we test whether financial conservatism
(if H1 holds) is more value relevant to firms in countries
that have stronger ties with the US and the UK (common
law countries) where the credit supply shock originated.
We, thus, hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis: 4 The mitigating role of financial conserva-
tism on firm value during the GFC is more pro-
nounced for firms in countries with common law
legal systems.
3 | METHODOLOGY
To examine the effects of financial conservatism on firm
value, we estimate the following model:
yijt = α+ γ1Crisist + γ2Crisist ×FCi + βX ijt−1 + η j + ηt + ϵijt
ð1Þ
where yijt is the value of firm i in country j at time t; γ1, γ2
and β are coefficients to be estimated; Crisist is a dummy
that takes the value of one over the period 2008–2012
and zero otherwise; FCi is a dummy that takes the value
of one for financially conservative firms and zero other-
wise; Xijt − 1 is a vector of firm-specific characteristics
explained below; ηj and ηt are the country and time-fixed
effects; and ϵijt is the error term. As financial conserva-
tism (FCi) is time-invariant, the coefficient of FCi in
Equation (1) is absorbed by the firm-fixed effect. For
robustness, we use several definitions of financial conser-
vatism (FCi), namely: zero leverage (ZL) for firms with-
out debt, almost zero leverage (AZL) for firms with less
than 1% debt, and ultra-low leverage (UL) for firms with
less than 5% debt. Our measures of financial conserva-
tism are based on the pre-crisis period to avoid the possi-
ble compounding effects of the credit shock on financing
decisions (see Angrist & Pischke, 2008). The vector Xijt − 1
consists of return on assets (ROA), sales growth (SG),
cash and cash equivalents (Cash), property, plant and
equipment (PPE), size (Size) and the median of the
dependent variable.6
To investigate the variations of the effect of leverage
on firm value, we next estimate a modified version of
Equation (1) that includes three leverage dummies
(D2ijct − D4ijct) as follows:-
yijt = α+
X4
k=2
λkDkijt + γ1Crisist +
X4
k=2
λ0kDkijt ×Crisist
+ βX ijt−1 + η j + ηt + ϵijt
ð2Þ
where
P4
k=2
βkDkijct is a vector of financing (leverage) poli-
cies defined below with slope coefficients from λ2 to λ4.
D1ijt (low leverage), D2ijt (low-medium leverage), D3ijt
(medium-high leverage) and D4ijt (high leverage) are
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dummy variables that take the value of one and other-
wise zero if firm i in industry j at time t is categorized
as following one of the four leverage policies. For
example, D1ijt is equal to one if a firm is categorized in
the first quantile of the leverage level and otherwise
zero. We drop D1ijt (low leverage) to avoid the dummy
variable trap. To deal with unobserved heterogeneity,
we include firm, country and time-fixed effects in all
regressions and report standard errors that are clus-
tered at firm level.
4 | DATA
Our sample consists of publicly listed firms extracted
from Thomson Reuters Datastream over the period
2003–2012. As is standard in the literature, we exclude
firms in the financial and utility sectors, those with miss-
ing data on key variables and firms with more than 100%
growth in assets or sales (see Baek, Kang, & Suh
Park, 2004; Enikolopov, Petrova, & Stepanov, 2014). We
only retain firms that have at least one observation in
TABLE 1 Variable definitions
Variable Source Definition
Q DataStream Market value of equity plus total debt-to-total assets (firm value [Tobin's q]).
MVE DataStream Market value of equity-to-book equity.
TSR DataStream Total shareholder return.
ZL DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has no debt, and zero
otherwise.
AZL DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has almost zero leverage
(≤1%), and zero otherwise.
UL DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has less than 5% debt
and zero otherwise.
FC DataStream A dummy that takes the value of one for financially conservative firms and zero
otherwise.
NFC DataStream A dummy that takes the value of one for non-financially conservative firms and
zero otherwise.
D1 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorized into the
first quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
D2 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorized into the
second quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
D3 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorized into the
third quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
D4 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorized into the
fourth quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
Debt DataStream Total debt-to-total assets.
ROA DataStream Operating income-to-total assets.
SG DataStream Sales growth.
Cash DataStream Cash and equivalent-to-total assets.
Size DataStream Log of total assets.
Foreign sales DataStream Foreign sales-to-total assets.
Dual listing DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is dual-listed and zero
otherwise.
IndMedQ DataStream The industrial median firm value in each year.
IndMedMVE DataStream The industrial median MVE in each year.
IndMedTSR DataStream The industrial median TSR in each year.
Civil Country classifications into civil and common law are based on La Porta
et al. (1997).
Note: The table lists the definitions and sources of all variables used.
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both the pre-crisis (2003–2007) and the crisis periods
(2008–2012). All variables used are winsorized at the
lower and upper one percentile. Our final unbalanced
sample consists of 5,320 firm-year observations
(901 firms) from seven African countries (Egypt, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and
Tunisia). All variables used are defined in Table 1.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all the var-
iables. Panel A, for the main variables, shows an overall
mean (SD) of 1.578 (0.818), 2.248 (1.723) and 0.226
(0.0.574) for firm value (Q), market value-to-equity
(MVE) and total shareholder return (TSR), respectively.
These summary statistics are in line with the literature.7
Comparisons of the periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012
suggest that the GFC had a significant negative effect on
firm value (Q), MVE and TSR. The changes for the other
firm-specific factors around the GFC period are not sig-
nificant and less pronounced, except for ROA and size
(Size). Panel B presents the difference in firm value
between the period 2003–2007 and 2008–2012, and across
non-financially conservative (Non-FC) and financially
conservative (ZL, AZL and UL) firms. The results show
that the value of financially conservative firms decreased
less than that for non-financially conservative firms. This
significant and more pronounced decrease in value for
non-financially conservative firms (Non-FCs) is consis-
tent across different measures of firm value, namely
MVE and TSR. These differences are consistent with our
main hypothesis (H1) and show a priori that conservative
financial policies reduce the adverse effects of the GFC
on firm value.
Figure 1 plots firm value for the four quantiles of
firms categorized by leverage. Figure 1(a) shows that firm
value decreases with leverage and, more importantly, it is
higher in the pre-crisis period (2003–2007) than in the
crisis-period (2008–2012) across all leverage quantiles. In
Figure 1(b), we observe similar variations in firm value
around the GFC for the box plots based on a shorter
window-period (2006–2009). This provides prima facie
evidence that the GFC had a negative effect on firm value
and that this effect varies with the level of leverage.
Figure 2 presents the cross-country differences in firm
value. Of particular interest are the variations in firm
value between the periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012,
which show that the value of firms in civil law countries
(Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Morocco) increased, while that
of firms in common law countries decreased. We link this
result to differences in the level of integration with the
countries where the crisis originated (the US and UK).
Thus, firms in countries that have closer economic, legal
and social ties to the US and the UK (common law coun-
tries) were more affected than those in civil law
countries.
Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations of all vari-
ables used. Firm value (Q) is positively correlated with
cash flow, debt, MVE and size, while it is negatively cor-
related with cash. These correlations are as expected,
except for cash, which suggests that firms reduce cash
holdings to finance investments.
5 | RESULTS
To test our main hypothesis (H1), we estimate
Equation (1) that relates firm value to financial conserva-
tism (ZL, AZL and UL), a financial crisis dummy (Crisis),
an interaction term of financial conservatism with the
financial crisis and other control variables. Table 4 sum-
marizes our main findings.
Columns (1)–(8) of Table 4 consistently show that the
GFC (Crisis) has a negative and significant effect on firm
value. This result holds for both a longer (2003–2012) and
shorter (2006–2009) window-period around the GFC,
and is broadly consistent with our first hypothesis
(H1) and the literature on advanced economies (see Baek
et al., 2004; Enikolopov et al., 2014; Gupta,
Krishnamurti, & Tourani-Rad, 2013). We further find
that the interaction term, Crisis×FC, is positive and sig-
nificant, which implies that financially conservative firms
were less affected by the credit supply shock. Our results
show that the value of levered firms decreased by 0.567
and that for zero-leverage (ZL) firms increased by 0.161
(γ1 + γ2) (in Column 2). We find similar but lower
decreases of 0.155 and 0.309 for the other measures of
financial conservatism, namely AZL firms in Column
(3) and UL firms in Column (4), respectively. Columns
(5)–(8), for the shorter window-period (2006–2009), show
similar results, with ZL firms experiencing a moderate
increase in firm value. Similarly, the value of AZL and
UL firms decreased by a small and insignificant margin.
Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients of
Equation (1) with indicator variables for 2003–2007,
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 interacted with the dummy for
non-financially conservative firms (NFCi). These plots
indicate that levered firms (non-financially conservative
firms (Non-FC)) experienced significant decreases in firm
value from 2007 onwards. The decrease in firm value that
we document is robust to alternative definitions of finan-
cial conservatism (as shown in Figure 3(a) and (b)).
These results are in line with Table 4 and suggest that
financial conservatism enhances or preserves firm value
during credit supply shocks.
We next examine the effects of the GFC across firms
with different levels of debt financing (leverage). To do
this, we estimate Equation (2) augmented with three
dummies that capture differences in the level of debt
6 MACHOKOTO ET AL.
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MACHOKOTO ET AL. 7
financing used by the sample firms. Table 5 summarizes
the results for our augmented model.
Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient esti-
mates of the three leverage policies (D2, D3, D4) in Col-
umn (1) are negative and insignificant. This suggests that
the firms have similar values before the crisis despite the
differences in financing structures. However, Column
(2) shows that the estimate of the coefficients on the cri-
sis dummy (Crisis) and the interaction terms (Crisis×D2,
Crisis×D3 and Crisis×D4) are significant. Columns
(3) and (4) for the shorter window-period around the
GFC (2006–2009) show similar results. This provides fur-
ther supporting evidence for our first hypothesis
(H1) and suggests that firms with high levels of debt
experienced a relatively more pronounced decrease in
firm value during the GFC.
We next examine the effects of international business
exposure on the relationship between firm value and
financial conservatism (H2 and H3). We partition firms
into two groups based on whether a firm is dual-listed
(Yes) or not (No) and whether it has foreign sales (Yes)
or not (No). Table 6 summarizes the estimation results
for these sub-samples.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that dual-listed firms were
more affected by the GFC than domestic or local firms,
which suggests negative spillover effects of bonding.
However, this effect is less pronounced for financially
conservative firms. This implies that financial conserva-
tism moderates or reduces the adverse effects of credit
supply shocks on firm value for cross-listed firms. Our
results suggest that financial conservatism is a mecha-
nism through which firms with foreign listings can
(a) (b)
FIGURE 1 Firm value and leverage before and during the crisis. The figure plots firm value for the four subgroups of firms over the
sample periods 2003–2012 and 2006–2009. In each year, we partition the firms into four quantiles based on leverage, namely, Low, Low-
Medium, High-Medium and High. The central horizontal line in the box is the median while the top and bottom of the box are the 25th and
75th percentiles, respectively. The upper and lower whiskers are the maximum and minimum values, respectively. The sample consists of
listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the periods 2003–2012 and 2006–2009.
All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles
(a) (b)
FIGURE 2 Firm value by country before and during the crisis. The figure plots firm value by country (a) and for the percentages
change in firm value from the pre-crisis (2003–2007) and crisis (2008–2012) (b). The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial
firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are
winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles
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MACHOKOTO ET AL. 9
manage exposure to international business risk, espe-
cially during periods of heightened economic
uncertainty.
Similarly, we find that firms with foreign sales, in
Panel B, were more affected by the GFC relative to firms
without international sales. However, the negative effect
of contractions in credit supply on the value of firms with
foreign sales is less pronounced for financially conserva-
tive firms. These results are consistent with our second
(H2) and third (H3) hypotheses. These findings suggest
that even-though internationalization is beneficial for
firms, it also inadvertently increases exposure to interna-
tional market risks and is a channel through which eco-
nomic shocks are transmitted across countries. However,
as our results show, this negative effect diminishes with
financial conservatism.
Finally, in Table 7, we examine whether the effects of
the GFC on firm value vary with legal origin and whether
financial conservatism moderates this effect. We estimate
Equation (2) that includes a dummy for civil law coun-
tries and its interaction with the crisis and financial con-
servatism dummies (Crisis×Civil×FC). The coefficient of
the Crisis dummy is consistently negative and in line
with our prior results. We further find that the coefficient
of the interaction term, Crisis×Civil, is positive and signif-
icant. This suggests that, unlike firms in common law
countries, those in civil law countries were immune to
the crisis since they are less integrated with the US and
the UK where the crisis originated. The results are consis-
tent with Figure 2, which shows that Kenya, Egypt,
South Africa and Nigeria were more adversely affected by
the crisis, while the effect is less pronounced for Ivory
TABLE 4 The effects of financial conservatism on firm value
2003–2012 2006–2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.296a 2.130a 2.133a 2.015a 10.808a 10.125a 10.386a 10.290a
(0.591) (0.566) (0.566) (0.583) (1.084) (1.050) (1.068) (1.080)
Crisis −0.513a −0.567a −0.573a −0.585a −0.431a −0.495a −0.493a −0.493a
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044)
Crisis×ZL 0.728a 0.608a
(0.152) (0.141)
Crisis×AZL 0.418a 0.352a
(0.097) (0.103)
Crisis×UL 0.276a 0.203b
(0.069) (0.076)
ROA 0.979a 0.925a 0.923a 0.959a 0.434c 0.278 0.316 0.343
(0.084) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.202) (0.198) (0.207) (0.213)
SG 0.131a 0.121a 0.131a 0.136a 0.119 0.096 0.121 0.129
(0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089)
Cash 1.006a 0.944a 0.982a 1.012a 1.371a 1.331a 1.398a 1.422a
(0.144) (0.154) (0.151) (0.149) (0.265) (0.264) (0.265) (0.265)
Size −0.083c −0.062d −0.067d −0.060 −0.626a −0.573a −0.593a −0.589a
(0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.073)
IndMedian 0.360a 0.295a 0.328a 0.330a 0.081 0.042 0.051 0.069
(0.051) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.073) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070)
N 4,669 4,669 4,669 4,669 1,896 1,896 1,896 1,896
Firms 901 901 901 901 678 678 678 678
R2 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.29
Note: The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis), financial conserva-
tism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL) and firm-specific variables. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected Afri-
can countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the lower
and upper one percentiles. a, b, c and d indicate significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Coast, Tunisia and Morocco. This suggests that the effects
of the GFC vary with legal system, and countries that are
more tied to the US and the UK are more affected than
others. Columns (2)–(4) further shows that the interac-
tion terms of financial conservatism and the crisis
dummy are consistently positive and significant, which
supports Hypothesis 4 (H4). Columns (5)–(8) show simi-
lar results (for the period 2006–2009) which suggests that
our findings are robust to changes in the window-period
around the GFC. Overall, the results show that financial
conservatism reduces the adverse effects of the credit sup-
ply shocks in common law countries while it enhances
firm value in civil law countries.
In summary, our results confirm the adverse effect of
the GFC on firm value as reported in the US by Duchin
et al. (2010) and Almeida et al. (2011). We also show that
the effect of the GFC on firm value varies with the level
of leverage and international business exposure. Our fur-
ther analyses, however, reveal that financially conserva-
tive firms and those without international exposure were
less affected by the GFC than high-levered firms and
those with international business exposure (the emerging
market multinationals (EMMNEs)). More importantly,
we find that financial conservatism reduces the adverse
effect of internationalization on firm value during the
GFC. Hence, our results highlight the significant effect of
financing activities on real decisions, which becomes
more apparent during periods of heightened uncertainty,
such as the GFC.
6 | ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we implement a battery of robustness
tests. First, we re-estimate our baseline model of
Equation (1) using MVE and TSR as the dependent vari-
ables. Table 8 summarizes the results for these alternative
proxies of firm value.
Table 8 shows that, in all specifications, the coeffi-
cient of the crisis dummy (Crisis) is negative and signifi-
cant, but the coefficients of the interaction terms between
the financial conservatism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL,
ZLL) and the crisis dummy (Crisis) are positive and sig-
nificant. This finding is consistent with our central
hypothesis (H1) and implies that firms in these countries
were adversely affected by the 2008–09 credit supply
shock despite being less integrated with developed econo-
mies, and that this effect is less pronounced for
(a)
(b) (c)
FIGURE 3 The changes in firm value of non-financially conservative relative to financially conservative firms. The figures plot the
coefficients estimation Equation (1) with indicator variations for 2003–2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 interacted with the dummy for non-
financially conservative firms. The indicator for 2008 is omitted so that the coefficients from the regressions are interpreted as measuring the
firm value are relative to that in 2008. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn
from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the lower and upper one
percentiles
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conservative firms. Columns (1) and (2) show the robust-
ness of our results to the use of alternative proxies of firm
value and confirms that financial conservatism preserves
or enhances firm value during the GFC.8
Next, in Columns (3)–(8) of Table 8, we replicate the
main analyses using sub-samples for South Africa and
other countries. The aim is to ensure that our results are
not mainly driven by one country (in this case
South Africa). Columns (3)–(5) show that the coefficient
of the crisis dummy (Crisis) is negative and significant,
which suggests that the crisis had a similar adverse effect
on firm value for firms in South Africa and other coun-
tries as shown in the previous sections. Columns (3)–
(5) show that the interaction term, Crisis×ZL, is positive
and significant, which suggests that financially conserva-
tive firms were less affected by the credit supply shock.
Columns (6)–(8) show similar results for firms in other
countries (excluding South Africa). Based on these
results, we conclude that our baseline results are unlikely
to be driven by one or a few countries in our sample.
We further conduct a robustness test where we re-
estimate our baseline model across four industrial sec-
tors, namely basic materials (BM), consumer goods and
services (CG&S), health and technology (H&T) and
industrial (IND) sectors. Consistent with our main
results, Columns (9)–(12) show that the crisis had a sig-
nificant adverse effect across all four sectors. Similarly,
we find that financially conservative firms across all sec-
tors, except for those in the H&T sectors, were less
affected by the crisis. We attribute the somewhat puz-
zling result for the H&T sectors to binding financial con-
straints as untabulated results (available from the
authors) show that these firms are smaller and younger
than their non-conservative counterparts. A combination
of the aforementioned characteristics in addition to oper-
ating in a very risky sector result to the adverse effects of
the crisis outweighing the benefits of financial conserva-
tism, thus leading to the negative overall coefficient
(Crisis + Crisis×ZL). Based on this finding, we interpret
the financial conservatism that we observe for firms in
the H&T sector as externally imposed (due to binding
credit constraints) rather than being deliberate or due to
internal strategic choice.
Finally, we estimate a modified version of
Equation (1) in which we replace the crisis dummy
(Crisis) and the interaction term (Crisis×FCi) with lagged
corporate debt (Debtijt − 1). This enables us to directly
examine how corporate debt affects firm value. In
Figure 4, we plot the coefficient of lagged corporate debt
for the cross-sectional yearly regressions of firm value
while controlling for ROA, SG, cash and cash equivalent
(Cash), PPE, size (Size) and the industrial median of mar-
ket value (IndMedQ). The yearly plots of the coefficients
show significant variation in the effect of corporate debt
on firm value. Over the sample period, the negative effect
of corporate debt on firm value peaks in 2006, which
implies that symptoms of the crisis were visible earlier in
Africa. This negative effect dissipates (Figure 4(a)) or is
stable (Figure 4(b)) from 2006 onwards, which suggests
TABLE 5 The effects of leverage policies on firm value
2003–2012 2006–2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.968a 2.005a 10.161a 9.949a
(0.569) (0.588) (1.073) (1.091)
D2 −0.021 0.027 −0.095 −0.035
(0.038) (0.050) (0.062) (0.081)
D3 −0.034 0.072 −0.168c −0.065
(0.043) (0.058) (0.072) (0.080)
D4 −0.089d 0.016 −0.180c −0.107
(0.048) (0.062) (0.083) (0.097)
Crisis −0.159c −0.341a
(0.067) (0.079)
Crisis×D2 −0.090 −0.098
(0.059) (0.083)
Crisis×D3 −0.202b −0.197c
(0.062) (0.095)
Crisis×D4 −0.199b −0.145d
(0.063) (0.086)
ROA 0.982a 0.945a 0.423c 0.285
(0.084) (0.081) (0.204) (0.228)
SG 0.130a 0.131a 0.129 0.122
(0.038) (0.038) (0.089) (0.087)
Cash 0.978a 0.961a 1.329a 1.331a
(0.145) (0.150) (0.267) (0.276)
Size −0.077c −0.063 −0.604a −0.561a
(0.038) (0.038) (0.071) (0.073)
IndMedian 0.364a 0.350a 0.083 0.077
(0.051) (0.049) (0.073) (0.071)
N 4,669 4,669 1,896 1,896
Firms 901 901 678 678
R2 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29
Note: The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that
relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis), leverage pol-
icy dummies (D2, D3, and D4) and firm-specific variables. The sam-
ple consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected
African countries drawn from Datastream over the periods
2003–2012 and 2006–2009. All variables used are defined in Table 1
and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c
and d indicate significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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TABLE 6 Internationalization, financial conservatism and firm value
Panel A: Dual listing
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.640b 1.867c 2.399b 1.996c 2.464b 1.769c 2.496b 1.530d
(0.825) (0.815) (0.793) (0.780) (0.791) (0.783) (0.818) (0.816)
Crisis −0.391a −0.664a −0.440a −0.721a −0.447a −0.725a −0.429a −0.756a
(0.056) (0.050) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057) (0.051)
Crisis×ZL 0.493b 1.196a
(0.186) (0.105)
Crisis×AZL 0.329c 0.524a
(0.128) (0.143)
Crisis×UL 0.128 0.414a
(0.095) (0.094)
ROA 1.022a 0.923a 0.996a 0.830a 0.987a 0.849a 1.011a 0.903a
(0.144) (0.102) (0.139) (0.087) (0.142) (0.094) (0.143) (0.094)
SG 0.102c 0.176b 0.093d 0.165b 0.098c 0.182b 0.103c 0.186b
(0.052) (0.058) (0.049) (0.053) (0.050) (0.056) (0.051) (0.056)
Cash 0.746a 1.381a 0.678a 1.351a 0.715a 1.373a 0.754a 1.368a
(0.190) (0.209) (0.201) (0.207) (0.198) (0.212) (0.193) (0.214)
Size −0.098d −0.076 −0.075 −0.068 −0.082 −0.062 −0.086 −0.046
(0.057) (0.051) (0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.049) (0.056) (0.052)
IndMedian 0.220a 0.606a 0.184a 0.475a 0.200a 0.555a 0.210a 0.542a
(0.056) (0.084) (0.051) (0.086) (0.054) (0.084) (0.055) (0.081)
N 2,371 2,298 2,371 2,298 2,371 2,298 2,371 2,298
Firms 515 386 515 386 515 386 515 386
R2 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.37 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.35
Panel B: Foreign sales
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.523a 1.319 2.213a 1.405 2.267a 1.423 2.319a 1.744d
(0.655) (0.932) (0.633) (0.915) (0.633) (0.916) (0.658) (0.911)
Crisis −0.387a −0.794a −0.454a −0.838a −0.452a −0.858a −0.429a −0.872a
(0.048) (0.070) (0.048) (0.072) (0.048) (0.062) (0.051) (0.063)
Crisis×ZL 0.639a 0.855a
(0.179) (0.209)
Crisis×AZL 0.321b 0.773b
(0.102) (0.251)
Crisis×UL 0.120 0.681a
(0.075) (0.167)
ROA 0.843a 1.277a 0.840a 1.177a 0.822a 1.168a 0.841a 1.138a
(0.101) (0.130) (0.099) (0.115) (0.101) (0.115) (0.102) (0.111)
SG 0.087c 0.264a 0.075d 0.253a 0.085c 0.259a 0.088c 0.267a
(0.042) (0.066) (0.040) (0.063) (0.041) (0.063) (0.042) (0.063)
(Continues)
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that African firms recovered much earlier than those in
developed countries. The stable coefficient for the
restricted sample of only firms that are listed in Africa
over the period 2006–2010, in Figure 4(b), further sug-
gests that firms with operations outside Africa were more
affected than local or domestic firms. These results, as
shown previously in Table 6, indicate that cross listing is
one of the channels through which credit supply shocks
are transmitted across capital markets. Overall, our
robustness analyses confirm that financing policies have
a significant effect on firm value as is consistent with our
main results.
7 | SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
Motivated by the ongoing debate on whether managers
leave money on the table by adopting conservative financ-
ing policies, we use a large sample of African firms and the
GFC as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effects of
financial conservatism on firm value. Specifically, we exam-
ine the effects of the GFC on firm value and how this is
moderated by financial conservatism. We then examine
how the effects of the GFC and the moderating role of
financial conservatism vary across local and international
firms and across countries with different legal systems.
Our study makes several contributions to theory and
practice. First, we find robust and significant adverse
effects of the GFC on the value of publicly listed firms in
emerging markets that are less integrated with developed
economies. Our further analyses show that, relative to
firms in civil law countries, the adverse effects of the
GFC were more pronounced for firms in common law
countries that have stronger ties to the US and the UK
where the financial crisis originated. This provides new
evidence on the far-reaching effects of the 2008–2009
contraction in credit supply and how ties in legal systems
aid the transmission of economic shocks across countries.
Second, we find that the adverse effect of the GFC is,
however, less pronounced for financially conservative firms,
which suggests that adopting conservative financing policies
preserve firm value during crises periods. This is contrary to
the mainstream literature, which shows that using debt
financing is beneficial as it increases the interest tax shield,
lowers financing costs and mitigates the extraction of pri-
vate benefits by managers. Instead, our results suggest that
such benefits associated with debt financing may not suffi-
ciently outweigh those arising from financial conservatism
(in the form of financial flexibility), particularly during
periods of marked contractions in credit supply.
Third, we show that strategic adoption of financial
conservatism is one way of effectively managing risk,
especially during economic downturns and for firms with
exposure to international business risk (firms with for-
eign sales or cross-listings). Our results suggest that
financial conservatism increases financial flexibility,
thereby immunizing firms against credit supply shocks in
both local and international capital markets. By showing
that the effects of the GFC vary with financing policies,
we also provide further and more direct evidence on the
contentious nexus between financing and real corporate
activities. This also serves as a forewarning of the poten-
tial adverse effects of over-leveraging and the need to
TABLE 6 (Continued)
Panel B: Foreign sales
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash 0.675a 1.480a 0.605a 1.412a 0.662a 1.428a 0.691a 1.434a
(0.157) (0.278) (0.172) (0.268) (0.163) (0.268) (0.158) (0.277)
Size −0.099c −0.054 −0.067 −0.058 −0.076d −0.058 −0.082d −0.069
(0.048) (0.055) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.054) (0.048) (0.054)
IndMedian 0.264a 0.752a 0.202a 0.761a 0.243a 0.754a 0.256a 0.668a
(0.046) (0.167) (0.036) (0.166) (0.040) (0.161) (0.043) (0.164)
N 2,720 1,949 2,720 1,949 2,720 1,949 2,720 1,949
Firms 675 354 675 354 675 354 675 354
R2 0.23 0.35 0.26 0.36 0.24 0.37 0.23 0.38
Note: The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis), financial conserva-
tism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL) and firm-specific variables. Figure (a) includes all firms while Figure (b) is for the restricted sample exclud-
ing firms not listed or headquartered in Africa. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries
drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the lower and upper one
percentiles. a, b, c and d indicate significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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develop robust risk management strategies, especially
given the recent surge in corporate debt (Lund, Woetzel,
Windhagen, Dobbs, & Goldshtein, 2018; Machokoto
et al., 2020) and predictions of another eminent crisis as
firms appear to be taking investment risks similar to
those that led to the 2008–2009 GFC (see Duffie, 2019;
Syriopoulos, Makram, & Boubaker, 2015).
Finally, contrary to prior literature on the bonding
hypothesis (e.g., Areneke & Kimani, 2019; Charitou &
Louca, 2009; Coffee, 2002; Lel & Miller, 2008) which doc-
uments significant positive spillover effects on firm value,
we find that bonding is not always beneficial, especially
during crises periods as it increases contagion risks. Our
results show that firms which cross-list to gain access to
TABLE 7 Legal origin, financial conservatism and firm value
2003–2012 2006–2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.344a 2.182a 2.189a 2.087a 10.623a 10.197a 10.356a 10.280a
(0.591) (0.569) (0.570) (0.585) (1.076) (1.045) (1.063) (1.067)
Crisis −0.544a −0.574a −0.582a −0.597a −0.473a −0.504a −0.506a −0.509a
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043)
Crisis×civil 0.909a 0.370a 0.374a 0.387a 0.832a 0.412a 0.414a 0.417a
(0.128) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Crisis×ZL 0.586b 0.412c
(0.179) (0.175)
Crisis×civil×ZL 0.259 0.233
(0.244) (0.229)
Crisis×AZL 0.322b 0.214c
(0.100) (0.108)
Crisis×civil×AZL 0.515b 0.431c
(0.191) (0.185)
Crisis×UL 0.224b 0.121
(0.070) (0.076)
Crisis×civil×UL 0.618a 0.521b
(0.178) (0.168)
ROA 0.975a 0.933a 0.932a 0.957a 0.411c 0.309 0.336 0.350
(0.084) (0.078) (0.081) (0.080) (0.201) (0.204) (0.209) (0.214)
SG 0.126a 0.121a 0.129a 0.133a 0.118 0.105 0.125 0.130
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089)
Cash 1.006a 0.959a 0.992a 1.016a 1.306a 1.298a 1.329a 1.338a
(0.144) (0.150) (0.148) (0.148) (0.266) (0.264) (0.266) (0.265)
Size −0.082c −0.065d −0.067d −0.060 −0.611a −0.578a −0.589a −0.585a
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072)
IndMedian 0.322a 0.281a 0.298a 0.294a 0.066 0.040 0.043 0.052
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
N 4,669 4,669 4,669 4,669 1,896 1,896 1,896 1,896
Firms 901 901 901 901 678 678 678 678
R2 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
Note: The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis), financial conserva-
tism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL), civil law dummy (Civil), and firm-specific variables. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-
financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the periods 2003–2012 and 2006–2009. All variables used are
defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c and d indicate significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
MACHOKOTO ET AL. 15
T
A
B
L
E
8
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e
su
b-
sa
m
pl
es
an
d
de
fi
n
it
io
n
s
of
fi
rm
va
lu
e
Se
ct
or
ia
l
an
al
ys
is
A
ll
fi
rm
s
So
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
O
th
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
B
M
C
g&
S
H
&
T
IN
D
M
V
E
T
SR
Q
M
V
E
T
SR
Q
M
V
E
T
SR
Q
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
C
on
st
an
t
4.
87
7a
4.
99
1a
1.
68
7b
3.
79
2b
5.
44
9a
1.
66
7
4.
52
1
5.
18
2b
3.
94
3a
−
2.
29
1
1.
91
4
4.
70
1a
(1
.1
37
)
(0
.6
98
)
(0
.5
85
)
(1
.1
90
)
(0
.7
74
)
(1
.7
73
)
(3
.7
13
)
(1
.6
75
)
(1
.0
73
)
(1
.4
50
)
(1
.3
96
)
(0
.6
62
)
C
ri
si
s
−
0.
80
2a
−
0.
24
9a
−
0.
71
3a
−
0.
62
2a
−
0.
22
8a
−
0.
35
7a
−
0.
77
1a
−
0.
32
6a
−
0.
68
9a
−
0.
43
7a
−
0.
53
0a
−
0.
55
8a
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.0
51
)
C
ri
si
s×
Z
L
1.
13
6a
0.
32
8a
0.
38
4d
0.
42
4d
0.
25
8a
0.
98
1a
1.
54
3a
0.
24
8c
1.
69
7a
0.
33
8d
−
0.
31
6b
0.
52
7a
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.1
97
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.2
14
)
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.1
74
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.1
35
)
R
O
A
1.
62
7a
−
0.
48
9a
0.
89
0a
1.
61
0a
−
0.
42
3a
1.
21
6b
1.
40
0
−
0.
46
2
0.
41
7a
2.
23
8a
1.
51
8a
0.
99
4a
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.1
84
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.4
17
)
(0
.9
00
)
(0
.3
39
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.3
31
)
(0
.4
12
)
(0
.2
14
)
SG
0.
28
4a
0.
12
0c
0.
11
9b
0.
30
2a
0.
09
9d
0.
21
4d
0.
24
0
0.
28
8c
0.
20
7b
0.
03
1
−
0.
14
8
0.
15
2b
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.2
23
)
(0
.1
23
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.1
23
)
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.0
50
)
C
as
h
1.
59
9a
0.
14
4
1.
10
8a
1.
91
0a
0.
21
9
0.
17
7
0.
54
5
−
0.
06
1
1.
36
5a
0.
64
6d
0.
56
2d
0.
90
4a
(0
.3
08
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.3
26
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.3
53
)
(0
.7
24
)
(0
.3
05
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.3
45
)
(0
.2
99
)
(0
.1
96
)
Si
ze
−
0.
19
0c
−
0.
30
3a
−
0.
06
4d
−
0.
15
1d
−
0.
32
8a
−
0.
01
6
−
0.
17
2
−
0.
34
1b
−
0.
14
1c
0.
24
0c
−
0.
05
7
−
0.
23
1a
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.0
44
)
In
dM
ed
ia
n
0.
22
2a
−
0.
01
7
0.
60
3a
0.
46
8a
−
0.
04
0
0.
09
2c
0.
07
4d
−
0.
26
6a
0.
15
3b
0.
14
3
0.
23
7
0.
14
9c
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.2
39
)
(0
.0
64
)
N
4,
66
9
4,
66
9
3,
64
7
3,
64
7
3,
64
7
1,
02
2
1,
02
2
1,
02
2
1,
36
7
1,
33
3
37
7
1,
59
2
F
ir
m
s
90
1
90
1
64
7
64
7
64
7
25
4
25
4
25
4
26
1
25
9
71
31
0
R
2
0.
26
0.
15
0.
36
0.
31
0.
20
0.
17
0.
13
0.
14
0.
41
0.
30
0.
37
0.
40
N
ot
e:
T
h
e
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
E
qu
at
io
n
(1
)
th
at
re
la
te
s
th
e
fi
rm
va
lu
e
to
th
e
cr
is
is
du
m
m
y
(C
ri
si
s)
,f
in
an
ci
al
co
n
se
rv
at
is
m
du
m
m
y
(Z
L
)
an
d
fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
va
ri
ab
le
s.
T
h
e
th
re
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
m
ea
su
re
s
of
fi
rm
va
lu
e
ar
e
fi
rm
va
lu
e
(Q
),
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e-
to
-e
qu
it
y
(M
V
E
)
an
d
to
ta
l
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r
re
tu
rn
(T
SR
).
C
ol
um
n
s
(1
)
an
d
(2
)
in
cl
ud
es
al
l
fi
rm
s,
w
h
ile
C
ol
um
n
s
(3
)–
(5
)
is
fo
r
fi
rm
s
in
So
ut
h
A
fr
ic
a
an
d
C
ol
um
n
s
(6
)–
(8
)
is
fo
r
fi
rm
s
fr
om
ot
h
er
co
un
tr
ie
s
(e
xc
lu
di
n
g
So
ut
h
A
fr
ic
a)
.C
ol
um
n
(9
)
is
fo
r
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
B
as
ic
M
at
er
ia
ls
(B
M
)
se
ct
or
.C
ol
um
n
(1
0)
is
fo
r
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
C
on
su
m
er
G
oo
ds
an
d
Se
rv
ic
es
(C
G
&
S)
se
ct
or
s.
C
ol
um
n
(1
1)
is
fo
r
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
H
ea
lt
h
an
d
T
ec
h
n
ol
og
y
(H
&
T
)
se
ct
or
s.
C
ol
um
n
(1
2)
is
fo
r
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
In
du
st
ri
al
(I
N
D
)
se
ct
or
.T
h
e
sa
m
pl
e
co
n
si
st
s
of
li
st
ed
n
on
-u
ti
li
ty
an
d
n
on
-f
in
an
ci
al
fi
rm
s
in
se
le
ct
ed
A
fr
ic
an
co
un
tr
ie
s
dr
aw
n
fr
om
D
at
as
tr
ea
m
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
20
03
–2
01
2.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
us
ed
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
in
T
ab
le
1
an
d
ar
e
w
in
-
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
lo
w
er
an
d
u
pp
er
on
e
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s.
a,
b,
c
an
d
d
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
0.
01
%
,1
%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
16 MACHOKOTO ET AL.
external finance and benefit from better governance
systems (following on the bonding hypothesis of
Coffee (2002)), fare worse than domestic firms during the
GFC, except if they are financially conservative. Overall,
our findings yield strong support for the moderating role
of financial conservatism on firm value during the
2008–2009 contractions in credit supply.
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ENDNOTES
1 Several studies report contradictory results on the effects of the
GFC on corporate decisions. For example, Duchin, Ozbas, and
Sensoy (2010) and Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2011) find
that the crisis had a significant adverse effect on corporate invest-
ment. However, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find no significant
differences between non-bank-dependent and bank-dependent
firms of the effect of the crisis on debt issuance and capital
expenditure.
2 The channels through which financing activities affect real deci-
sions are subject to debate (see Chava & Roberts, 2008;
Stein, 2003). Since the credit supply shock originated in developed
countries (the US and the UK), it should be orthogonal to African
firms and their operating environment. This ought to reduce con-
cerns of compounding effects (Popov & Rocholl, 2018; Puri,
Rocholl, & Steffen, 2011).
3 For studies that examine the determinants of zero-leverage see
Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan, and Krishnamurthy (2012), Bessler
et al. (2013), Dang (2013), and El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and
Zheng (2018).
4 This addresses the concentration of studies on the effects of the
GFC in the US (Almeida & Campello, 2007; Chava &
Purnanandam, 2011; Kahle & Stulz, 2013).
5 Similarly, Graham and Leary (2011) also conclude that covenant
violations during the GFC did not significantly limit access to fur-
ther credit as lenders were more willing to renegotiate.
6 The choice of firm-specific factors is informed by the literature
(e.g., Fama & French, 1998; Gamba & Triantis, 2008; Kim, Park, &
Suh, 2018).
7 See Ojah and Pillay (2009), Agyei-Boapeah and Machokoto (2018)
and Machokoto, Areneke, and Ibrahim (2020).
8 In unreported results, we include a set of macroeconomic control
variables that may affect firm value and find that our main con-
clusions do not change. This should allay concerns of other omit-
ted variables such as macroeconomic factors biasing our
inferences.
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